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Introduction
The enlargement of the European Union (EU) 
in 2004 and 2007 has made it a more significant 
actor in the world by increasing its number to 
27 member states. At the same time however, 
this enlargement has also made the EU less 
homogenous. Currently facing the financial crisis 
and the challenge of institutional reform, the EU is 
not ready for further enlargement, all the more so 
because of the presence of so-called enlargement 
fatigue. Nevertheless, the EU has tried to create 
mechanisms for cooperation with neighbouring 
countries. These mechanisms are designed to avoid 
dividing lines within Europe, to create a “ring of 
friends” (European Commission 2003: 4), to help 
adjust standards across the continent, and to bring 
interested countries closer to the EU. The Republic 
of Moldova (hereafter referred to as Moldova) is 
among these countries.
Moldova started the transition period more or 
less successfully, being the first country from the 
former Soviet Union after the Baltic States, to be 
accepted as a member of the Council of Europe1 in 
1995 (Serebrian 2005). Its pro-western demarche 
however, did not finish here and European 
integration became the main priority of Moldova’s 
foreign policy in the following years.2 The first 
success for Moldova was the negotiation of the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) 
in 19943, which entered into force in 1998 and 
established an economic and political framework 
for the relationship. Moldova has consistently 
expressed its willingness to join the EU. Despite 
having no membership perspective, and unlike 
the Ukrainian political establishment, Moldova’s 
political elites, consisting of all parties represented 
in the Parliament, continue to declare European 
integration their priority, while the EU continues 
1  Accepted as a country under the monitoring of the Council 
of Europe (CoE). This CoE monitoring continues to this day.
2  Moldova has had some short periods of foreign policy 
reorientation towards Russia in 1995-1998 and 2001-2003, and a 
certain degree of reorientation in 2007 and 2009.
3  Due to the long ratification procedure within the EU, the 
PCA formally entered into force on 1 July, 1998.
to request different reforms and apply a certain 
degree of conditionality on the basis of the PCA 
and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 
established in 2004.
Conditionality is understood in this paper 
as a strategy whereby the EU offers rewards in 
exchange for the target country fulfilling the 
requirements set by the EU (Kratochvil/Lippert 
2008; Schimmelfennig et al. 2002). This paper 
analyses those areas in which the EU has made 
considerable efforts to adjust Moldova’s policies 
and standards to those of the EU. Moreover, it 
focuses on the impact these efforts have had on the 
country. It is noteworthy that Moldova is adjusting 
to the EU without the prospect of membership. 
Interest in Moldova has increased since the 
Russian-Georgian conflict in August 2008, because 
of certain similarities with Georgia – namely, that 
both have breakaway regions supported by Russia. 
Nevertheless, differences between these countries 
prevail. In the case of Moldova, the EU has a more 
significant interest because Moldova is situated on 
its own borders and the EU is interested in keeping 
the Transnistria settlement process peaceful and 
ongoing, especially taking into consideration that 
the nature of both the Georgian and Moldovian/
Transnistrian conflicts are different. The most 
apparent instance of EU attention being paid to 
Moldova however, could be observed after the 
2009 elections (5 April, 29 July) and during the 
post-election protests from April that led Moldova 
into a political crisis.  
The aim of this paper is to evaluate whether EU 
conditionality is working in Moldova and whether 
it is capable of producing effects similar to those 
achieved in the accession countries in 2004 and 
2007. The timeframe of the analysis is 2001-2009, 
the period during which Moldova had a communist 
government with a strong pro-European rhetoric 
but exhibited merely a selective compliance with 
EU conditionality. In order to answer this question, 
it is necessary to address further questions, such 
as: Which types of conditionality does the EU 
utilise? Which internal and external factors have 
an impact on the effects of EU conditionality? Are 
EU incentives sufficiently credible and sizeable 
to ensure Moldova’s compliance? What does 
Moldova expect from the EU and is Moldova 
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meeting the EU’s expectations? 
These questions suggest the structure of this 
paper, which is divided as follows: firstly, types 
of conditionality and the EU’s conditionality 
enforcement in accession countries and ENP 
countries will be presented briefly. Secondly, the 
EU’s policy instruments applied in the case of 
Moldova – democratic and economic conditionality 
and socialisation – will be analysed. Thirdly, 
external and internal factors that could impede the 
impact of EU incentives will be analysed with a 
special focus on the ‘Russian factor’ in Moldova. 
The final section highlights shortcomings 
of the current EU approach and of Moldova’s 
compliance and it recommends certain actions 
that could significantly improve the efficiency of 
EU-Moldova cooperation.
I. Types of conditionality and the EU’s 
conditionality enforcement in acces-
sion and ENP countries
In the last two decades, the EU’s success in 
achieving high standards of economic development 
has led many of its surrounding countries to 
express their willingness to join4 this sui generis 
organisation. Nevertheless, the selection criteria 
for EU membership are different to those of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
during the Cold War. At that time, states had to 
oppose the Soviet Union and be able to militarily 
defy the ‘Soviet threat’. In the case of the EU, 
states need to adjust to the political, administrative 
and economic structures of the EU in order to 
join.5 Under this adhesion logic, the EU started to 
build its relations with all those who applied for 
membership in the 1990s and, today, with those 
countries in its immediate neighbourhood by 
requesting reforms in exchange for rewards. In the 
case of the accession candidates, the reward was 
clear: membership in the EU. Requirements and 
rewards in the case of the ENP countries are less 
obvious, with the exception of the Governance 
Facility, which is a less fuzzy concept due to its 
clear criteria of beneficiary selection.
Within academic circles, this strategy is 
called EU conditionality. There are many types 
of conditionality (e.g. political, economic, social, 
etc.) but the general definition is the “practice 
of setting conditions for the provision of a 
good from one actor or organisation to another” 
(Agné 2008). Today, a significant proportion of 
the conditionality applied by the EU is linked 
to standards in a wide range of areas, but most 
importantly in democratic institutions (European 
Commission 2009). Democratic conditionality is 
understood as the main strategy of international 
4  The first official statement asking for Moldova’s 
association to the EU was addressed on 13 December, 1996 by 
the former President of Moldova Petru Lucinschi to the European 
Commission’s President, Jacques Santer. 
5  Today, NATO has specific criteria for membership, 
too; candidate countries have to fulfill the criteria agreed to in the 
Membership Action Plan (MAP).
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actors and organisations to influence non-
member states to respect their fundamental rules 
of statehood. Schimmelfennig et al. (2002: 1-2) 
define conditionality as an applied mechanism 
of reinforcement by a social actor to change the 
behaviour of another actor, while reinforcement 
represents a system of social control by which 
compliance is rewarded and non-compliance is 
punished.
The EU as leverage in its relations has always 
used conditionality with membership candidates 
and third countries. EU conditionality was 
introduced at the end of the 1980s and in the early 
1990s, when the EU formalised conditionality 
in European Agreements and the Copenhagen 
Criteria. Post-communist Central and East 
European countries thus “became the first target 
of a very demanding political, economic and 
social conditionality, closely linked with the 
process of transition towards democracy and 
market economy” (Anastasakis/Bechev 2003: 5). 
The first programmes of cooperation between the 
EU and countries willing to join it were related 
to trade and financial assistance through the 
European Agreements and PHARE6 programme, 
which were available to Central and Eastern 
European applicants. In this regard, “in 1992, the 
EU introduced a clause of reprieving within the 
European Agreements the signing of trade and 
cooperation agreements if the target country does 
not respect five fundamental areas: 1) rule of law; 
2) human rights; 3) multi-party system; 4) free and 
fair elections and; 5) market economy” (Grabbe 
2008: 23). This first example of conditionality 
was followed by other important documents that 
laid out broader areas for cooperation and outlined 
concrete desired outcomes to be achieved by the 
applicant countries. The Copenhagen Criteria, 
established in 1993, “formally spelled out the link 
between democracy and membership” (Merkel 
6 The programme of Community Aid to the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe (PHARE) was the main instrument for 
pre-accession assistance to EU candidate countries. The main aim 
of this programme was to support the countries in implementing the 
acquis and to teach them to manage structural funds. It was launched 
in 1989 to support the reconstruction of the economies of Poland and 
Hungary and in 1994 became available to all candidate countries. 
In 2007, PHARE was replaced by the Instrument for Pre-accession 
Assistance (European Commission 2009).
2008: 27) and raised the standards by also including 
an economic criterion and the acceptance of the 
acquis as mandatory, making membership much 
more difficult to achieve. In the case of Moldova, 
this paper will analyse the key instruments such as 
Autonomous Trade Preferences, Visa facilitation, 
budgetary support, EUBAM and others.
A state to which conditionality is applied 
is expected to change its behaviour in order 
to avoid punishment for non-compliance. In 
The Conditions of Conditionality, the authors 
emphasise four types (strategies) of conditionality 
once an international organisation has set out its 
conditions (Schimmelfennig et al. 2002). In the 
case of a state accepting the conditions, it is clear 
that the state receives the rewards; in the case 
that it does not, the international organisation: 
a) withholds the reward, which is called reactive 
reinforcement; b) inflicts punishment, which is 
called coercive (proactive) reinforcement; or c) 
provides support, which is called supportive (also 
proactive) reinforcement (See Figure 1).
The EU most often uses the reactive 
reinforcement strategy. As Scholtz argues: “EU 
conditionality (in the case of the ENP) is mainly 
‘positive’, that is, the EU offers and withholds 
carrots but does not carry a big stick” (Scholtz 
et al. 2007: 6). The EU does not punish the non-
compliant state but withholds the reward and 
sometimes even gives extra money through the 
Governance Facility. Thanks to this feature, EU 
conditionality is widely perceived as positive 
conditionality. There have, however, been some 
exceptions, for example in the case of Belarus, 
where the EU has applied travel restraints on 
Belarusian leaders, withdrawn access to the 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) 
(European Commission 2009) and also applied 
some other restrictive measures that can be 
categorised as coercive reinforcement. However, 
the employment of negative conditionality 
requires a careful analysis of “where pressure 
can be effective” (Youngs 2008: 2) and must be 
based on a study of how EU policies influence the 
domestic political environment. 
Today, the EU has several levels of conditionality, 
which it applies to different countries or groups of 
countries, according to the level of development 
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of their relationship and to the progress registered 
in areas where the EU requires changes. There is 
no doubt that enlargement is considered the most 
powerful incentive for pursuing reforms. This is 
the reason why “enlargement is often called the 
most successful foreign policy of the European 
Union” (Schimmelfennig/Scholtz 2007: 2). The 
membership perspective is considered to be 
the best instrument for inducing states to accept 
conditions, due to the size of the reward and its 
credibility. Alongside membership, there are strict 
rules established for the accession process, which 
in the past have “vested the EU with considerable 
transformative power and contributed significantly 
to economic recovery, peace and stability as well 
as democratisation” in the transition countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe (Scholtz/
Schimmelfennig 2007: 3). More than this, the 
EU’s “pre-accession instruments highlight the 
involvement and active role of the EU as an 
authoritative external actor” (Lippert/Umbach 
2005: 43). For countries without a membership 
perspective, however, conditionality is different in 
both its character and consistency.
After the EU enlargement of 2004, the ENP 
was created with “the objective of avoiding the 
emergence of new dividing lines between the 
enlarged EU and its neighbours” (Maron 2007: 
1). It is aimed at transforming the target countries 
through political dialogue, export of the acquis 
and economic assistance, “though all in reduced 
doses” (Popescu 2009b), in comparison with the 
enlargement policy. The ENP, together with the 
recently launched Eastern Partnership7 (EaP) 
is perceived as an alternative to the accession 
process. At the same time however, the instruments 
used by the EU in the eastern neighbourhood 
are not able to produce such high-quality results 
as those achieved in the case of enlargement, in 
part, because the conditions are unclear and the 
deadlines are not enforced (Chirila 2009a).
Before evaluating the features of the (democratic, 
economic or social) conditionality that is being 
applied to Moldova by the EU, it is important to 
mention that the success of conditionality depends 
very much on the local political elite of the country 
subjected to conditions (Schimmelfennig 2007). 
If authorities in a given state are not willing to 
implement the policies recommended by the EU, 
then the implementation of conditionality will fail 
from the very beginning and democratic change 
will not take place. As Benita Ferrero-Waldner 
pointed out, “democracy can never be imposed 
from outside: genuine democratic transition must 
always come from within” (Ferrero-Waldner 2006: 
3).
7  For the southern countries, the EU boosted its engagement 
by creating the ‘Union of the Mediterranean’. 
Figure 1. Strategies of Conditionality (Schimmelfennig et al. 2002)
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While the EU is establishing the conditions under 
which certain states will receive their rewards, these 
states are usually calculating the costs and benefits 
of the reform before initiating its implementation. 
Consequently, the implementation of reforms 
requested by the EU turns into an exercise in cost-
benefit calculation by the target state. As a result, 
the general rule is that “the positive impact of the 
EU on democracy in outsider states increases with 
the size and the credibility of the EU’s conditional 
incentives” (Scholtz/Schimmelfennig 2007: 6). 
In other words, the larger and more credible the 
reward, the more likely it is that the state will 
comply with the established conditions. 
As mentioned before, until now, the most 
credible and functional reward was the promise of 
membership, which is considered to be a “mega-
incentive” (Emerson/Noutcheva 2005: 13, emphasis 
in original) and the Moldovan political class still 
perceives the membership perspective as its own 
biggest incentive (Leanca 2010). In the same 
context, interdependence is often asymmetrical 
in favour of the EU. This is the case for instance, 
when a country subjected to conditionality requires 
the EU as export market or is reliant on receiving 
European aid, but the EU is not, in principle, 
dependent on the goods, which are being produced 
in that country. The dependence of the said country 
on its exports to the EU makes its relationship 
highly asymmetrical in favour of the EU. There are 
some exceptions to this, for example in the case 
of big countries like Ukraine. The gas crises from 
January 2009 showed very well that in some cases 
there might be a mutual dependence.
II. EU policy instruments in the case 
of Moldova: democratic and econo-
mic conditionality and socialisation
Academics argue that the nature of conditionality 
in the case of the EU is very fluid (Sasse 2008, 
Chirila 2009b, Davalga 2009). There are many 
inconsistencies in its application (by both the 
European Commission and by the EU in general) 
over time and no clear-cut causal relationship 
between the application of conditionality and 
reforms in the ENP countries, including Moldova. 
On the one hand, all instruments used by the EU 
in its Eastern neighbourhood are instruments 
of conditionality. When Moldova is not doing 
something required or advised by the EU, it can 
lead to a tougher EU position towards Moldova. 
On the other hand, these processes are usually 
very difficult to trace and to prove because of the 
absence of clear cause-effect links.8 As a result, a 
brief analysis of official documents signed between 
Moldova and the EU will be beneficial.
The EU uses many policies and mechanisms 
that could be considered instruments of positive 
conditionality. Important policies relevant to the 
case of Moldova are the ENP and the EaP, while 
significant agreements include the PCA, the 
EU–Republic of Moldova Action Plan and Visa 
Facilitation and Readmission Agreements. In 
addition, the instruments of positive conditionality 
include the European Neighbourhood and 
Partnership Instrument (ENPI), Progress Reports, 
the monitoring of elections and other “linkages”9 
that form the chain of EU-Moldova relations and 
will be emphasised in the following overview.
Officially, the EU established its relationship 
with Moldova through the PCA that was 
negotiated and signed in 1994 and entered into 
force on 1 July, 1998. The PCA has become the 
basic and most important document establishing 
8  Adomas Davalga, researcher at the Institute of 
International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University, 
interview by author, 27 July, 2009, Chisinau, Moldova.
9  Trans-national relations, cross-border cooperation 
and exchange that are influencing the domestic situation (Scholtz/
Schimmelfennig 2007).
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the relationship between the EU and Moldova. It 
is a rather general document and is designed more 
as a register of areas in which both parties could 
eventually cooperate. The PCA was inspired 
by the European Agreement, however, with a 
different finalité: it establishes the institutional 
framework, while the European Agreement gave 
a clear perspective for association to the EU 
(Serebrian 2005). 
It can be argued that the PCA signed between 
the EU and Moldova is not employing EU 
conditionality. The document shows a general 
commitment to democracy and market economy 
principles and is not focused on concrete 
obligations. However, there are some signs of 
conditionality, for example, art. 49 of the PCA 
states that Moldova should protect intellectual 
property rights and should adhere to multilateral 
conventions in this area within not more than five 
years (European Community 1994: 12). This is an 
example of an economic issue that does not touch 
the main problematic areas of Moldova in the areas 
of human rights, freedom of speech, independence 
of the judiciary, etc. Moreover, it is not clear what 
happens if Moldova does not comply.
The ENP could be considered a strategy that 
embodies a form of “conditionality light” because 
the most important components of conditionality 
(clear incentives and enforcement structures) 
“are vague for both the EU and its neighbouring 
countries” (Sasse 2008: 3). The ENP generally 
resembles something between partnership and 
membership, being called the “politics of the 
half-open door” (Timmerman 2003: 8). However, 
the most sizeable and attractive aspect of the 
ENP is the provision that it has been designed 
to allow the target countries to benefit from a 
variety of incentives. This refers especially to 
the four freedoms (free movement of services, 
goods, capital and persons), following the model 
“everything but institutions” (Prodi 2002) as 
described by Romano Prodi, then President 
of the European Commission. Nevertheless, 
“the reference to the freedom of persons has 
disappeared from Council documents – it has been 
replaced by references to visa agreements” (Sasse 
2008: 8).
The most recent policy initiative that was 
adopted between the EU and its eastern neighbours 
is the EaP. This Swedish-Polish initiative was 
initiated to make a distinction between those 
countries to the east and those to the south of the 
EU. While it was made clear that Morocco10 cannot 
join the EU, due to its geographical location, 
Moldova and other EaP countries do not face this 
impediment. The relations between the EU and 
all six countries11 included in this project are at 
a different level of development. All countries, 
except Belarus, are in the same institutional 
framework – PCA and ENP. Initially, Moldova 
(and Ukraine) adopted a critical approach to this 
initiative, which was characterised by the former 
President of Moldova, Vladimir Voronin, as an 
attempt to create an EU-launched Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS) (Voronin 2009). Such 
statements, however, ignore the fact that the EU 
does not simply make promises but also offers 
financial support. Neither Moldova nor Ukraine 
appear to be satisfied with this EU proposal 
(Meister/May 2009), claiming that there should 
be a clear perspective for integration in the EU. 
Russia considered the EaP as interference in 
its sphere of influence (Popescu/Wilson 2009), 
but partially accepted the project after the EU-
Russia summit held in Khabarovsk on 21-22 May, 
2009. The EaP multilateral platforms deepen 
and strengthen measures for a better sectoral 
integration of the eastern countries. In fact, the 
EU’s attempts to renew its neighbourhood policy 
on an almost annual basis (ENP, New Ostpolitik, 
Black Sea Synergy, EaP) give proof of a lingering 
dissatisfaction on both sides as to how things 
stand (Popescu 2009b). Having outlined the 
general strategies and policy framework, the next 
subsections will discuss economic conditionality, 
socialisation and democratic conditionality.
10  Morocco applied to join the EU in 1987 and was rejected 
on the grounds that it is not (geographically) a European country. 
11  These countries are Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, 
Azerbaijan, Armenia and Belarus.
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Economic conditionality
The most obvious conditionality is present in 
concrete documents that offer tangible incentives. 
Probably the most relevant of these is the 
Agreement of Autonomous Trade Preferences 
(ATP), which sets several conditions under which 
Moldova can sell its goods on the European 
market: a) certify the origin of goods, b) respect 
methods of administrative cooperation with the 
EU set out in the Agreement, c) cooperate to 
prevent any risk of fraud, d) non-application 
of any restrictions for goods imported from the 
EU, e) implement the priorities from the EU-
Moldova Action Plan, especially those chapters 
related to economic reforms and, f) engagement 
to comply with conventions signed by Moldova 
(European Council 2008). Certainly, the EU is 
expecting a sort of spill-over from the economic 
to the political dimension in order to shape a 
situation in which Moldova would be ‘forced’ to 
cooperate due to economic dependence on the 
EU. Consequently, there would be a transfer of 
EU practices and standards. In the same context, 
another relevant example is the Macro Financial 
Assistance (MFA) offered to Moldova by the EU. 
Since 1991, the EU has given €87 million and the 
current grant of €15 million has been conditioned, 
requiring from Moldova certain reforms before 
disbursement. The main conditions required that 
Moldova strengthen its fiscal position, adopt a 
fiscal policy, which would lead to a reduction in 
the debt-to-GDP ratio, enhance transparency and 
management of public funds, improve the business 
climate and create better conditions for private 
sector development (European Commission 
2009). From these two examples, two conclusions 
can be drawn: the ATP conditionality is working 
well and is mostly generating the anticipated 
results. Moldova started to use the possibilities 
offered by the ATP and increased its exports to the 
EU to 54% in 2009 (National Bureau of Statistics 
2009). The MFA conditionality is, however, only 
partially effective. Whereas the business climate 
in Moldova appears to have improved (World 
Bank Group 2009), the internal debt-to-GDP ratio 
has grown (Vocea Basarabiei 2009) and the fiscal 
system has worsened. Besides this, and because 
of the elections and quest for power, the effects 
of MFA conditionality were outweighed by the 
internal mega-reward ‘electoral victory’.  
The possibility to prove the effects of 
conditionality depends on clear conditions; as 
compliance with such conditions can be more 
easily observed and measured (Reinhard 2008). 
To illustrate this, one can consider the case of the 
Visa Facilitation Agreement. In order to facilitate 
the issuing of visas for certain categories of 
citizens, such as students, journalists, officials and 
businessmen, and to grant free visas for certain 
other professionals and freelance categories 
(European Commission 2007a), Moldova had 
to sign the Readmission Agreement, which is 
designed to counter illegal migration and to oblige 
Moldova to readmit all persons not fulfilling the 
conditions of stay of a given EU state (European 
Commission 2007b). Thus, in small but important 
areas, the effect of conditionality can be observed. 
The ENPI is considered the instrument with 
the strongest conditionality and is applied on an 
annual basis. This perception of the ENPI is due 
to the funds offered to the Moldovan government 
as budgetary support within the framework of 
the Food Security Programme (FSD). These 
finances are offered in tranches and according to 
the recorded economic progress, making the FSD 
the “single financial instrument with a strong 
governmental conditionality”.12 In order to receive 
this budgetary support, Moldova has to comply 
with the conditions set in the FSD, which bind 
the government to spend the money on social 
assistance, poverty reduction and compensation 
for energy prices (European Commission 2009). In 
this context, it is noteworthy that the ENPI focuses 
on three priorities: 1) support for democratic 
development and good governance, 2) support 
for regulatory reform and administrative capacity 
building and 3) support for poverty reduction and 
economic growth (European Neighbourhood and 
Partnership Instrument 2007). So far, compliance 
with the ENPI has been deficient, due to the 
limited capacity of Moldova to absorb funds from 
the EU (Munteanu et al. 2009). This is despite the 
12  Dr. Igor Munteanu, Executive Director of the Institute for 
Development and Social Initiatives “Viitorul”, interview by author, 
26 July, 2009, Chisinau, Moldova.
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fact that good progress has been observed in the 
fulfilment of activities related to compensation of 
energy prices and social benefits and is explained 
by the fact that this is one of the easiest parts to 
comply with. 
Socialisation
Socialisation is a mechanism used by the EU, which 
positions the target country on the Europeanisation 
track and is defined as “a process of including 
behavioural and identity change through interaction 
with the [European] partner at any or all levels (e.g. 
government, business, civil society and students), 
which results in social learning, model emulation, 
lessons drawn, etc.” (Emerson/Noutcheva 2005: 
13). Today, the largest share of European assistance 
to Moldova is being offered under the ENPI, 
approved for the timeframe 2007-2013, and which 
contains budget support and technical assistance 
that indirectly boost the socialisation process among 
different professional groups. From 1991 to 2006, 
the European Community provided about €320 
million (European Commission 2006), mainly using 
the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (TACIS) Programme and through 
aid programmes. According to the evaluation of 
TACIS, the programme achieved “good results at 
the project level but had less impact at sector and 
national policy level partly due to a lack of continuity 
and coherent long-term sector planning” (European 
Commission 2007: 12). In many cases, this is due to 
the limited administrative and absorption capacity of 
Moldova.
In the same vein, the EU is currently using 
programmes such as Twinning13 and TAIEX14 to 
support the implementation of the Action Plan. 
These programmes are designed to support national 
authorities in preparing coherent sector strategies 
13  Pre-Accession Assistance for Institution Building – 
Twinning – is a programme launched in 1998 to help beneficiary 
countries in the development of modern and efficient administrations, 
with the structures, human resources and management skills needed 
to implement the acquis communautaire (European Commission 
2009).
14  The Technical Assistance and Information Exchange 
Programme (TAIEX) is an institution-building instrument for short-
term assistance in the adoption, application and enforcement of the 
Community acquis which has been operational since 1996. The 
programme is available for candidate countries, ENP countries and 
Russia (European Commission 2009).
and teach the employees who are working with such 
issues in the field. However, Moldova has made 
little progress in winning Twinning projects. As an 
example, one may consider the latest data for 2009, 
which shows that Moldova has a mere 8 projects 
(2 launched/ongoing and 6 under preparation/
identification), falling behind countries with less 
rhetoric on European integration and no demands 
on a membership perspective (except Ukraine): 
Morocco-32, Egypt-32, Ukraine-32, Tunisia-
23, Azerbaijan-21, Georgia-13 and Jordan-10 
(Vanhoeacker 2009). As for TAIEX, the results for 
Moldova are much better (88 projects), being overrun 
only by Ukraine (129 projects) (Vanhoeacker 2009). 
Although Twinning and TAIEX projects could easily 
be included under economic conditionality, the fact 
that most of these programmes generate a positive 
environment for socialisation through exchange 
and social learning, justify the inclusion of these 
instruments in considerations of the socialisation 
process. 
Even though, as a country, it is still relatively 
unknown amongst European students and 
institutions, Moldova did not make use of the 
Tempus IV and Erasmus Mundus programmes to 
their full extent. For example, the Progress Report on 
implementation of the ENP in 2008 shows that, for 
the academic year 2008-2009, 9 projects were won 
by Moldovan universities within Tempus IV and only 
6 students received scholarships under the Erasmus 
Mundus programme (European Commission 2009). 
This reveals a deficient dissemination of information 
about these programmes and an experience deficit 
among Moldovan students in dealing with study and 
research opportunities in the EU.
Last but not least, civil society plays an equally 
important role in the transformation of Moldova. The 
EU could rely on civil society as a credible partner, 
due to the latter’s potential to make demands and 
persuade the government to run more democratic 
reforms and deeper economic transformation. But, 
so far, the EU has poorly financed Moldova’s non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), showing 
interest mainly in electoral campaigns and some 
issues related to human rights and the environment 
(Munteanu et al. 2009). Thus, the top-down 
approach should be complemented with a bottom-up 
concept that could essentially raise the government’s 
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accountability as well as society’s awareness, as 
the assessment reports show that the EU is likely 
to fund more on government budget support than 
direct assistance to NGOs (2008 NGO Sustainability 
Index, 2009; 2009 NGO Sustainability Index, 2010; 
Munteanu et al. 2009).
A general assertion is that many organisations and 
institutions in Moldova do not know how to apply 
and use European funds to their full extent. The 
ENPI has a symbolic political aspect, because within 
the ENPI there are also programmes, which were 
previously available for accession countries. In this 
regard, Moldova and other ENP countries are being 
treated like accession countries. The ENPI financing 
is based on a system of earmarking of EU funds, 
which, however, results in more difficult access 
to EU funds. As a result, a political upgrade may 
become an economic downgrade. In this context, a 
viable solution would be the establishment of a joint 
EU-Moldova Application Unit in which EU experts 
would share their experience and teach others how 
to submit a successful application, which would lead 
to a greater degree of socialisation, as socialisation is 
done mostly within different exchange and twinning 
programmes. 
Democratic conditionality
In 2008, the PCA expired and was automatically 
extended by one year, due to its special provisions. 
The European Commission received a mandate to 
negotiate the new PCA in December 2008. However, 
the European Commission placed conditions on the 
negotiation of a new agreement by stating that the 
level and the quality of the future agreement would 
depend on the extent to which Moldova assured free 
and fair elections. However, the conditionality used 
by the EU has not served its purpose. The elections, 
held on 5 April, 2009, were only partially free and fair 
and were followed by violent protests (OSCE 2009). 
More compliance could be seen on the occasion of the 
early parliamentary elections (29 July, 2009), which 
were organised after the dissolution of the previously 
elected parliament. Although an improvement in the 
standard of elections was observed, they still remain 
in deficit. 
In February 2005, following the ENP 
framework, the EU and Moldova signed the EU – 
Republic of Moldova Action Plan15. The document 
is “consistent” (Buscaneanu 2007), having 80 
objectives, 294 actions and 7 areas of cooperation. 
The vast majority of these actions and objectives 
were to be implemented by Moldova, with only 
14 of these referring explicitly to the EU and 40 
concerning both. As such, the document illustrates 
an asymmetric volume of tasks and responsibilities 
following the “centre-periphery” model 
(Buscaneanu 2007). In general, the Action Plan 
resembles the Accession Partnership for candidate 
countries. The Commission’s ENP Country Reports 
are similar to the Commission’s opinions for the 
candidate countries and the ENP Progress Reports 
are comparable to the Commission Regular Reports 
for the candidates. However, the documents relating 
to ENP countries contain fewer details on the reform 
progress (Sasse 2008). The monitoring process is 
“reminiscent of the formalism, generalities and 
absence of clear benchmarks that characterised the 
regular reports on the candidate countries during the 
Eastern enlargement” (Sasse 2006: 1).
Generally, the EU–Moldova Action Plan 
is monitored quite attentively. However, the 
statements on the non-implemented chapters 
remain very cautious and usually no punishments 
or consequences are mentioned. Even if, according 
to official reports, only 2 of 147 actions have 
experienced backsliding, the EU observes limited 
or minor progress among the remainder.16 The 
EU’s policy of engagement through dialogue with 
Moldova has been characterised as “keeping the 
issue of democracy and human rights high on the 
agenda, but not really punishing the undemocratic 
practices” (Kwarciak/Panainte 2006: 34). The 
reason for such behaviour is the EU’s desire to 
keep Moldova at least partly cooperative17 (Youngs 
2008). Otherwise, if the EU punished Moldova, the 
latter might cooperate with Russia and put a stop 
15  EU-Moldova Action Plan, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/
pdf/action_plans/moldova_enp_ap_final_en.pdf, accessed 2 August, 
2010.
16  Dr. Igor Munteanu, Director of the Institute for 
Development and Social Initiatives “Viitorul”, interview by author, 
26 July, 2009, Chisinau, Moldova.
17  Harald Berwanger, Expert of the German Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) on Eastern Europe, interview by author, 11 
August, 2009, Berlin, Germany.
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to ongoing reforms. On the other hand, it may be 
argued that this is unlikely to happen, given that the 
majority of Moldova’s exports go to the EU.18 
Following the objectives of the Action Plan, 
the EU has appointed the European Union Special 
Representative (EUSR), who formerly represented 
Javier Solana and now represents Catherine Ashton19 
and the Council of the EU. The EUSR deals mainly 
with the promotion of the EU-Moldova political 
dialogue and the Transnistrian conflict. So far, 
the EUSR has not substantially influenced EU-
Moldova relations. This is mainly due to a systemic 
gap. The European Union Delegation has funds and 
instruments and does not appear to be very active, 
whereas the EUSR has no money or instruments but 
is publicly visible and trying to promote the EU’s 
18  Victor Chirila, Executive Director of Foreign Policy 
Association, interview by author, 11 June, 2009, Chisinau, Moldova.
19  The EU High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European 
Commission (changes made after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty).
messages.20
Nevertheless, Moldova has done better than 
most ENP countries in complying with EU 
conditionality.21 For example, Moldova is the 
only country from the CIS, in which a change 
of government occurred through elections and 
constitutional transfer of power in the last decade 
(Popescu 2009a). Thus, Moldova was rewarded 
in 2008 with the Governance Facility Programme, 
which allocated €16,6 million for good governance 
(European Commission 2009: 22) and for endorsing 
democratic change in the future. As the analysis 
of the democratic and economic conditionality 
has shown, their effectiveness should be treated 
separately, as they produced different results. Table I 
shows the main results of the above analysis.
20  Dr. Andrew Wilson, Senior Policy Fellow at the European 
Council on Foreign Relations, interview by author, 18 August, 2009, 
London, United Kingdom.
21  Dr. Nicu Popescu, Policy Fellow at the European Council 
on Foreign Relations, interview by author, 18 August, 2009, London, 
United Kingdom.
Instruments Assessment
Economic  
Conditionality
Autonomous Trade Preferences Mostly successful implementation and almost full compliance
Budgetary Support Almost full compliance and targeted spending
Visa Facilitation
Moldova signed the Readmission Agreement and is fully compli-
ant, but public opinion requests less documents for visa processing 
and extended categories of beneficiaries
Macro Financial Assistance Partially effective, half of the conditions were not met
Socialisation
Twinning Minimally effective due to small absorption capacity
TAIEX Highly effective (second country within ENP)
Civil Society Support Moderately effective due to a top-down approach and insufficient 
interest of the EU
Erasmus Mundus / Tempus
Moderately effective for Tempus and moderately/minimally effec-
tive for Erasmus Mundus
EUBAM
Effective/moderately effective in decreasing smuggling and increa-
sing transparency (see chapter III for full description)
Advisors As the EU advisory mission was deployed in spring 2010, there are no evaluation results so far
Democratic  
Conditionality
Action Plan
Moderately/minimally effective in terms of democracy issues, mo-
derately/highly effective in terms of economic issues and modera-
tely effective in terms of social issues
Election supervision Moderately/highly effective (mainly with regard to elections from 29 July, 2009)
EU Special Representative Moderately effective
Statements of EU’s Ambassadors 
to Moldova Minimally effective/moderately effective
Table I. The impact of EU conditionality in Moldova 2001-2009
SPES Policy Papers 2011
17
III. The impact of EU conditionality 
in Moldova: Analysing intervening 
variables
Evaluating the impact of EU conditionality in 
Moldova is fraught with challenges due to overlaps 
that could appear while assessing the implemented 
reforms in Moldova. These difficulties might result 
from the fact that one cannot precisely distinguish 
whether the government of Moldova is compliant 
with the requests of the EU due to an intrinsic 
motivation or because of globalisation trends. For 
a complete conditionality assessment one should 
analyse the factors that are intervening and changing 
the impact of the EU’s transformative power. These 
factors are (1) Russia; (2) Transnistria; (3) internal 
political struggles; and (4) EU hesitance because 
of Russia.
Russia 
The Russian Federation, as an historical and 
traditional player in this area, knows better than 
the EU how to employ conditionality and other 
instruments to achieve its interests and reduce the 
influence of the EU. Even if Moldova declared that 
its strategic priority was European integration, the 
current Moldovan government (and all previous 
governments) is still manipulated by Russia 
through key mechanisms where the EU is weak 
and has no tools to influence. The Transnistrian 
conflict, the Russian minority, the control of many 
media companies by Russian capital, Transnistria’s 
gas debt22 to Russia, the energy dependence on 
Russian energy resources, and the pro-Russian 
political parties are only a few examples where 
Russia is consistently outrunning the EU. 
In this context, the government regularly 
does not implement reforms due to the influence 
exerted by Russia. Some of these reforms are 
political or historical in nature (problem of Soviet 
occupation)23 and usually do not take place 
because Russia uses direct economic tools such 
as embargoes on different products. Other reforms 
are related to Moldova’s foreign policy priorities 
that Russia is trying to influence by its powerful 
media that is largely popular and broadcast in 
Moldova.
Table II gives a comparative overview of the 
EU’s and Russia’s use of soft power in the Eastern 
Partnership countries.
22  Insofar as Moldova does not recognise the breakaway 
region of Transnistria, the $US1.8 billion debt of Transnistria becomes 
Moldova’s debt.
23  For a detailed explanation see Miler (2010).
Russia European Union
Rhetoric of fraternity•	
Multilateral institutions with membership benefits•	
Strategic investments•	
Visa-free regime and open labour market•	
Protects authoritarian regimes•	
The “sovereign democracy” model•	
Sets the media narrative•	
EU information centres•	
Lingering accession hopes•	
Biggest trading partner•	
Economic opportunities•	
Aid to governments and civil society•	
Supports democracy•	
Table II. Russia’s and EU’s use of soft power in the Eastern Partnership countries 
(Popescu/Wilson 2009: 38)
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Internal struggles
The principles of the ENP, such as differentiation, 
socialisation and conditionality, cannot be clearly 
observed in Moldova, due to too small incentives 
offered by the EU. The biggest problem among 
Moldova’s elites is their calculation that the 
rewards are smaller than the cost of the reforms. 
Here appears the usual and simple question the 
Moldovan government poses: why should costly 
economic reforms be implemented if membership 
is not forecast? While starting many reforms, 
Moldova’s government needs to justify its 
decisions and the argument that the ‘EU requires 
this’ is not enough to proceed with implementation. 
Often, the reforms requested by the EU are not 
popular among citizens, like ENP reforms such as 
the “removal of state aid and subsidies” in order 
to improve market efficiency (Kratochvil/Lippert 
2008: 6). Many of the state-owned companies 
are still receiving financial aid from the state and 
the reforms requested by the EU might generate 
a wave of criticism. In general, the assurance of 
receiving a consistent reward might work as a 
catalyst for transformation. Nevertheless, even 
when the reward is attractive in principle, the 
governing party sometimes refuses to implement 
a particular reform arguing that the reward is in 
fact too small. A closer look, however, reveals 
that other reasons (e.g. the desire of the political 
leadership to consolidate its power base) account 
for this reluctance to implement the requested 
reform. 
Some authors argue that these mechanisms 
offer many opportunities to “deepen the rhetoric 
rather than the substance of the relationship” 
(Sasse 2008: 4). It seems a joke when “we (ENP 
countries) pretend to be converging on common 
European values and they (the EU) pretend to be 
helping us do so” (Emerson 2005: 1).
Although the results of the EU´s policy towards 
Moldova have not met the expectations that the EU 
had when it initially set up the ENP, there has been 
some progress. Compared with the Central Eastern 
European countries that joined the EU in 2004 
and 2007, conditionality is of course significantly 
weaker because of the lack of the accession 
incentive. It remains unclear to what extent 
lessons drawn from these examples could simply 
be transferred to Moldova with regards to the 
country’s different political, economic and social 
situation. Conditionality is also weaker because 
the assistance provided within the framework of 
the ENPI is comparatively small24 as compared to 
countries with an explicit accession perspective; 
and this also applies to instruments designed 
specifically to reward political reforms, such as the 
Governance Facility. Trade preferences, or even 
a future free trade agreement, offer considerable 
advantages. But, in the case of Moldova, they have 
been, or are likely to be, granted for economic or 
other political reasons and not only as rewards 
for progress; and once granted, they are not likely 
to be withdrawn even if the conditions are not 
fulfilled. In such cases, one could always calculate 
that the EU would prefer political dialogue over 
sanctions. 
One particular problem is that Moldovan 
authorities have adopted legislation to a number 
of requirements outlined in the EU-Moldova 
Action Plan, but fell short with their actual 
implementation (European Commission 2008b: 
2-8) due to the fact that reforms would generate 
uncomfortable democratic developments for some 
economic or political groups. This is another 
dissimilarity between Moldova and other Central 
Eastern European countries where the political 
leadership of the latter usually wanted faster and 
more decisive reforms for the modernisation of 
their countries themselves. In Moldova, reforms 
required within the framework of EU-Moldova 
relations have nearly always fallen short when 
they seemed to endanger the power base of the 
government. In conclusion, Moldovan ruling elites 
engage only in partial and rather careful reforms, 
while the EU has failed to provide enough 
attention and incentives that could significantly 
alter the domestic balance between those 
interested in favour and those against reforms 
within Moldova.25
The new government of Moldova that took 
24  For the period 2008-2012 Moldova will receive 
approximately €317 million from the EU (author’s calculations from 
different sources).
25  Dr. Martin Sieg, Foreign Policy and Security Adviser at 
the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU), interview by author, 
29 July, 2009, Chisinau, Moldova.
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office after the July elections in 2009 met some 
difficulties with the transfer of power from the 
communist party. The Alliance for European 
Integration, formed by four democratic parties, 
might have more chances to boost democratic 
reforms and to bring Moldova closer to the EU. 
The new government is asking for Moldova’s 
inclusion in the ’Balkan package’, but at the 
same time, many EU members26 recommend 
enhancing the cooperation within EaP. The EU’s 
openness towards the new government represents 
unprecedented levels of cooperation in a situation 
where Moldova finds itself in an economic 
crisis. The former government left behind a 
terrible financial situation and massive disorder 
in the judicial system that is causing significant 
difficulties in dealing with the government’s 
attempts to reform many sectors. 
Transnistria
 A good example of the EU’s partial success in 
Moldova is related to the Transnistrian conflict. 
Moldova’s refusal of the Russian federalisation 
plan “Kozak”27 is the outcome of EU and US efforts. 
On the same issue, in 2006 the EU established 
the European Union Border Assistance Mission 
(EUBAM) on the Moldova – Ukraine border in the 
perimeter of the Transnistria breakaway region28, 
an idea which Russia vehemently opposed. Even 
if the EU remains only as an observer, it is at least 
connected to the problems of Moldova’s territorial 
integrity. The EU’s interest in the Transnistrian 
issue significantly rose29 after the Russian-Georgian 
war (Grund/Sieg 2008), because the 
“war in Georgia demonstrated that the Russian 
pressure – economically, politically and ideologically 
– had failed. What is more, while Russian embargoes, 
26  Germany, Poland, Romania, Lithuania and Sweden.
27  The “Kozak” plan (officially Russian Draft Memorandum 
on the Basic Principles of the State Structure of a United State in 
Moldova) was a federalisation plan proposed by Russia in 2003 and 
rejected in the last moment by President Voronin due to the influence 
of many international organisations and diplomats.
28  The inclusion of the EU in the negotiation format (5+2) 
of the Transnistrian settlement should also be emphasised in this 
regard.
29 The mandate of EUBAM has been prolonged until 
December 2011.
blockades and energy cuts may advance Russian 
interests in the short run, in the long term they actually 
diminish Russian leverage by driving target states to 
diversify their economies or export markets” (Popescu/
Wilson 2009: 45). 
The EU became more engaged in order to assure 
that there would be no such developments as in 
Georgia in August 2008. The EUBAM represents a 
sort of conditionality instrument, but nevertheless, 
the EUBAM also brings transparency and more 
security to the border.30 Since Russia is supporting 
the conflict settlement in Transnistria at a declarative 
level, it does not openly criticise the EUBAM or 
other EU instruments that are used to deal with 
the Transnistria issue. However, Russia influences 
the process through so-called ‘Transnistrian 
leaders’ like Igor Smirnov who usually express the 
unofficial point of view of Russia. 
EU hesitance
The new PCA or the New Association Agreement 
(without a membership perspective) represents 
an important tool of influence. The EU agreed 
to negotiate the new agreement only after the 
Moldovan elections in April 2009 and July 2009 
(Botan et al. 2009). The problem is that, in the last 
four years, Brussels admonished that Moldova 
had not implemented a series of chapters from 
the EU-Moldova Action Plan mainly related to 
human rights, freedom of the media, independence 
of the judiciary and the fight against corruption 
(Prohnitchi et al. 2008). The EU’s claims, as 
voiced by European officials, were almost 
completely ignored by Moldovan representatives. 
Despite this fact, the EU has continued to tolerate 
the way in which Moldova pretends to implement 
democratic reforms, being ’appreciative’ of 
the pro-European rhetoric of the Moldovan 
government. Empty promises not backed up by 
any concrete action became almost a “déjà-vu” for 
European officials (Chirila 2009a). There is some 
evidence that the EU has geopolitical reasons for 
having very cautious and soft attitudes towards 
Moldova and other countries in the region, in 
order to avoid incurring Russia’s irritation (Chirila 
2009c; Munteanu 2009; Ciurea 2009). Thus, it is 
30  Elena Gnedina, Visiting Research Fellow at the Centre 
for European Policy Studies, interview by author, 18 August, 2009, 
London, United Kingdom.
SP
ES
 P
ol
ic
y 
Pa
pe
rs
 2
01
1
20
argued that as long as the EU is perceived to be a 
normative actor, playing the geopolitical game to 
the detriment of democracy promotion in some of 
the eastern countries – due to its unwillingness to 
irritate Russia – might result in a lack of credibility 
(Chirila 2009a). Among the factors impeding the 
implementation of the EU’s recommendations we 
can include the lack of political will within the 
former Moldovan government (2001-2009) to start 
a real political dialogue at the elite’s expense, the 
fear that Russia might punish Moldova for more 
openness towards the EU and for non-compliance 
with Russian ‘advice’, as the case of embargoes 
imposed on wine illustrated (Kratochvil/Lippert 
2008). 
The EU mainly failed to implement its policy 
in Moldova in the 2001-2009 period, particularly 
in the political sphere. The ENP and EaP might 
suffer the same destiny if the EU does not add 
clear components of European integration to these 
strategies, including a deep and comprehensive 
free trade agreement and visa liberalisation 
regime, both of which have already appeared on 
the EU-Moldova agenda. One might say that the 
EaP is offering both integration components (a visa 
liberalisation regime and free-trade) (European 
Commission 2008a), but these incentives should 
be strictly conditioned by timely and qualitative 
implementation of committed reforms, which is 
most likely to happen. The same can also be said 
for other policy areas, such as human rights and 
good governance (Chirila 2009b). In this context, 
a contributing factor to the EU policy’s failure is 
the EU’s limited knowledge about Moldova and 
Moldova’s dissatisfaction with the EU’s offered 
privileges31, especially those related to the visa 
regime.32
Since the Alliance for European Integration has 
come into power, there have been many meetings 
with EU officials. The most significant aspect 
of these meetings was the promise of a €100 
million credit from the EU, which was disbursed 
31  Dr. Anneli Ute Gabanyi, German Institute for International 
and Security Affairs, interview by author, 24 August, 2009, Berlin, 
Germany.
32  Dr. Nicu Popescu, Policy Fellow at the European Council 
on Foreign Relations, interview by author, 18 August, 2009, London, 
United Kingdom.
after Moldova received $US580 million from 
the International Monetary Fund (signed in late 
October 2009). It is also noteworthy to mention 
the €2 billion, which will be spent by development 
partners to reform the most important sectors 
within the “Re-Think Moldova” programme33. In 
contrast to Russia, the EU pays almost no attention 
to the colour of the governing party when giving 
financial support. The $US500 million worth 
of credit from the Russian Federation promised 
before the 29 July, 2009 parliamentary elections 
(Infotag 2009) was a clear signal of its support 
for the former government. After the Alliance 
of European Integration took office, the Russian 
government limited the credit to $US200 million 
and, in the end, revoked the availability of funds 
for Moldova.
The new Moldovan government should pursue 
a comprehensive reform path and involve society 
in the implementation of these reforms. In regard 
to a EU membership perspective, Moldova should 
focus on fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria 
and stop demanding a concrete membership 
perspective as a mandatory prerequisite for 
continuing the reform process. As this analysis 
has shown, there are many other reasons for the 
stagnation of Moldova’s reform process and the 
membership perspective will appear on the agenda 
as soon as reforms are carried out.
33  Government of Moldova, Rethink Moldova, Priorities for 
Medium Term Development, 2010, http://siteresources.worldbank.
org/INTMOLDOVA/Resources/Rethink-Moldova-2010-2013-Final-
edit-110310.pdf, accessed 30 March, 2010.
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Conclusions and recommendations
This research has shown that the impact of the 
EU’s conditionality is modest in Moldova and 
that conditionality has not been able to produce 
high quality results as in the case of the accession 
countries. Its impact in the political and economic 
fields should be considered separately.
It is obvious that Moldova would like to join 
the EU, but is not being encouraged by the rhetoric 
of the EU or by the partnership framework. The 
absence of the mega-incentive of membership 
makes the EU’s current incentives insufficient 
to induce Moldova’s compliance, given that the 
costs of the required reforms are bigger than the 
announced rewards. This also reduces the quality 
of the reforms; many of which have been adopted 
in legislation, but fallen short in implementation. 
Moreover, a lack of a clear-cut cause-effect links 
between conditionality and outcomes has had 
a deleterious effect. In many cases, reforms are 
implemented at the governments’ own initiative 
for adjusting to world economic trends and not as 
a result of European influence.
To advance its relationship with the EU, 
Moldova has to do its ‘homework’ by underpinning 
its rhetoric with some facts and filling its requests 
with some substance. Nevertheless, the EU 
continues to apply positive conditionality, even 
though Moldova is not fully complying. In this 
context, the EU does not inflict punishment for 
non-compliance, trying to engage with Moldova 
and create linkages, which might later become 
a point of leverage to influence Moldova and 
to apply stronger conditionality. However, a 
comprehensive analysis should be undertaken by 
the EU to determine where pressure could be most 
effective. Keeping Moldova cooperative with 
the EU is another reason for non-punishment. 
Otherwise, punishment may induce Moldova to 
cooperate more with Russia and to quit the reform 
path.
In line with the conditionality applied to the 
government, there should be a bottom-up approach 
with substantial support for NGOs in fields where 
Moldova still suffers from deficiencies, such as 
human rights, freedom of speech, social issues 
and other related concerns. Currently, Moldova’s 
society is not aware of many reforms and the top-
down approach is not able to produce high-quality 
results without civil society support, which is still 
modest and poorly financed.
Alongside Moldova, the EU has its own 
shortcomings. The ENP lacks instruments for 
political change, although it has leverage over 
economic development, the Autonomous Trade 
Preferences being a relevant example. In line 
with this instrument, the EU is expecting a spill-
over from economic to political dialogue, which 
might occur in the coming years if the EU remains 
Moldova’s biggest trade partner.
Finally, one of the main factors that are 
contributing to the failure of some policies 
in Moldova, but also in the whole eastern 
neighbourhood, is the Russian factor. Russia has 
a vital interest in keeping its influence in this area 
for reasons of geographical proximity and other 
benefits. The Russian Federation is successfully 
counterbalancing and often outrunning the EU 
in Moldova by using its hard power tactics, like 
blackmail, fuelling the Transnistrian conflict, 
energy resources, embargoes and soft power 
like media control, free-visa regime, strategic 
investments or Russian minorities. This makes the 
objective of keeping Moldova on the European 
integration path a challenging policy goal, which 
is nevertheless achievable.
As for my recommendations, there are several 
actions that could improve the ongoing reform 
process. The EU should:
boost its socialisation strategies by engaging •	
Moldova in more official frameworks (as sug-
gested in the EaP),
create an EU-Moldova Application Unit for •	
the earmarking EU funds,
increase the incentives for reforms, especially •	
along the political dimension, 
create a link between political progress and •	
economic incentives by granting larger eco-
nomic incentives for political reforms and 
compliance,
increase its involvement in the Transnistrian •	
conflict and continue to support EUBAM and 
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Moldova’s integrity,
adapt its policies to the specific situation in •	
Moldova, meaning co-ownership of partner-
ship and individualisation,
offer a better visa regime for circular migra-•	
tion until the visa liberalisation process is 
achieved,
intensify the political dialogue by offering •	
multilateral institutional membership/partici-
pation to/of Moldova, which would lead to a 
deeper relationship with the EU,
condition the amount of macro-economic •	
assistance (especially the budgetary support) 
upon the implementation (not only adoption) 
of laws,
monitor closely the implementation of the EU-•	
Moldova Action Plan.
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